UPND’s harsher economic decisions waiting until after you vote
…The next IMF programme could mean deeper economic pain for Zambians, but the government prefers not to tell voters until after the general elections.
By Kanyanta Chanda Kapwepwe
THERE is a quiet plan behind the United Party for National Development (UPND) government’s economic recovery narrative. Over the past year, the UPND government has worked hard to present Zambia’s economic story as one of recovery and renewed stability. Ministers frequently highlight the successful restructuring of Zambia’s external debt, the restoration of cooperation with international financial institutions, and the gradual stabilisation of macroeconomic indicators after years of fiscal turbulence.
In official speeches and public briefings, the message is always that the difficult years of economic crisis are behind us, and that the country has now recovered. To some extent, this narrative is justified. While Zambia has not recovered yet, the country did manage to navigate one of the most complex sovereign debt restructuring processes in modern African history.
However, beneath this carefully constructed narrative of economic recovery lies a disturbing, quieter development. The UPND government intends to enter another IMF programme shortly after the August general elections, if re-elected. This detail is not merely technical. It goes to the heart of the country’s economic trajectory. It means more hardship for Zambians because IMF programmes do not simply provide financial assistance. They also involve policy commitments, often requiring governments to adopt stricter fiscal discipline, reform subsidy systems, expand tax collection, and restructure state-owned enterprises whose financial performance places pressure on the national budget.
If UPND is indeed preparing to negotiate another IMF programme so soon after completing the previous one, it truly suggests that the country’s economic stabilisation has not yet been achieved. More importantly, it suggests that the next phase of economic reform may already be approaching. The timing of those discussions, so close to the election, therefore, raises an important question that deserves far more public scrutiny than meets the eye.
If you are wondering what the IMF programme actually means for citizens, here is a simplified way to put it. In reality, IMF programmes shape some of the most consequential economic decisions affecting governments, businesses, and households. When a country enters an IMF-supported programme, it does not simply receive financial support. Instead, the programme typically combines funding with a series of stringent policy commitments designed to stabilise public finances and strengthen economic governance.
These commitments often include measures aimed at controlling government spending, tax collection, subsidy systems, and the management of state-owned enterprises. In technical economic language, these measures are described as fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. In practical terms, they often involve difficult adjustments that can negatively affect public spending priorities, energy pricing systems, taxation policies, and the broader functioning of the national economy.
Countries recovering from debt crises usually move through multiple phases of IMF engagement. The first phase focuses on restoring macroeconomic stability and rebuilding international financial credibility. The second phase typically introduces deeper structural reforms designed to ensure that the fiscal problems that triggered the crisis do not return.
Zambia has already completed the first phase of this process, which exposed citizens to extreme hardships. The growing discussion about a successor IMF programme, therefore, suggests that the country may be entering the second phase, which typically introduces deeper hardships for citizens. Perhaps that is why the UPND government is not telling the voters until after the August 2026 general election. Instead, pressure has been mounting within the UPND government to implement cosmetic developments that brainwash voters in order to secure the next mandate.
After the next mandate is secured, the second phase of the IMF Programme will follow. However, Zambians are now clever and cannot easily be deceived. They have noticed the pattern of hardship during the past five years. Even the international observers are noticing the pattern with warnings.
Recent early warning signals from international financial observers have already begun highlighting that Zambia’s economic recovery may face renewed pressure. They have identified emerging fiscal pressures within Zambia’s economy, including rising expenditure commitments linked to the public sector wage bill and the expansion of agricultural support programmes. The IMF itself has also warned that Zambia’s election-cycle spending pressures may be contributing to a loosening of fiscal discipline. At the same time, the IMF has revised Zambia’s growth projections downward, reducing its expectations for economic expansion compared with earlier forecasts.
Growth that was previously expected to accelerate more rapidly is now projected to increase at a more modest pace. These developments matter because international financial institutions tend to interpret such signals as indicators of potential fiscal vulnerability. When growth expectations weaken while government expenditure commitments increase, analysts begin to worry about the sustainability of the fiscal framework that supports economic recovery. The current developments suggest that the stabilisation achieved in recent years remains fragile and could require further reforms to ensure long-term sustainability.
Perhaps the most disturbing pattern is the disconnect between the portrayed economic statistics and the household experience. While the government continues to emphasise macroeconomic recovery, many Zambians experience the economy through a very different lens. Food prices remain high in the country. Transport costs continue to rise, placing additional pressure on household budgets.
For a long time, electricity shortages disrupted business operations and increased the cost of doing business for many entrepreneurs. At the same time, youth unemployment remains stubbornly high, limiting economic opportunities for a generation entering the labour market. For households attempting to stretch limited incomes across rising living costs, the concept of economic recovery often feels distant from everyday reality.
This gap between macroeconomic statistics and lived economic experience has been frustrating among citizens. When the government celebrates recovery while households continue to experience the lingering effects of economic adjustment, and international observers simultaneously warn about rising fiscal pressures and slower growth, the disconnect between political messaging and economic reality becomes more difficult to sustain.
One of the factors contributing to the UPND government’s emerging fiscal pressures may lie in the dynamics of election-year politics. Economists have long documented a phenomenon known as the political business cycle, in which governments approaching elections often expand spending in politically sensitive sectors. Public sector wages, agricultural support programmes, infrastructure announcements, and social spending have become areas of increased expenditure during this election period.
Such spending is not necessarily a planned reform. The UPND government is facing competitive election pressures to respond to public demands and stabilise voter expectations during these politically sensitive moments. However, when fiscal discipline weakens during election periods, the economic adjustments required afterward can become significantly more difficult. If spending expands today, fiscal consolidation tomorrow becomes harder on citizens who bear the hardships.
This brings Zambia to a critical moment in its economic trajectory. With the discussions about a successor IMF programme underway, policymakers likely recognise that further economic adjustments may soon be necessary to sustain fiscal stability. Those adjustments could involve tighter control of government spending, reforms to subsidy systems, expanded revenue collection, or restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose financial performance places pressure on public finances.
These are not minor policy adjustments. They are structural reforms that shape the direction of national economic policy for years. Yet the national conversation ahead of the election has focused overwhelmingly on economic recovery rather than the reforms that may follow. That clearly signals that the most difficult economic decisions are being postponed until after the August 2026 general election. The tough economic decisions are waiting beyond the election.
At its core, the issue facing Zambia is not whether economic reform is necessary. The big issue is transparency. Countries emerging from debt crises often require multiple stages of policy adjustment before achieving lasting stability. The deeper issue is transparency. If the next phase of Zambia’s economic recovery will involve further fiscal discipline and structural reforms, the electorate deserves to understand the nature of those challenges before casting its votes.
Elections are not simply about choosing leaders; they are also moments when citizens evaluate the policy direction of their country and decide whether they support that direction. When major economic decisions are delayed until after elections, voters are left making choices without fully understanding the economic road they are voting for ahead. And that is precisely the question Zambia must now confront.
Zambia has seen this economic story before. For many Zambians, the current moment carries echoes of an earlier chapter in the country’s economic history. During the early 2,000s, Zambia also entered a period of fiscal adjustment under the presidency of Levy Mwanawasa. At the time, the MMD government undertook difficult economic reforms supported by international financial institutions, including fiscal discipline measures designed to stabilise the economy after years of economic mismanagement.
Those reforms were not politically easy. They involved tight control of government spending, restructuring of public finances, and difficult policy decisions that affected both public institutions and households. Yet the Mwanawasa administration chose to confront those adjustments openly, presenting them as necessary sacrifices required to restore Zambia’s long-term economic stability. The economic gains that followed were not immediate, but over time, the country experienced one of its most stable periods of macroeconomic management.
The current situation appears to be unfolding differently. Rather than presenting economic reforms as a national conversation about long-term stability, the government has focused its messaging almost entirely on the narrative of economic recovery. Meanwhile, discussions about a possible successor IMF programme are taking place largely within financial circles rather than in the broader public debate.
This difference in approach raises a deeper question about how economic policy is communicated to citizens. If Zambia is indeed approaching another phase of economic reform, the country deserves an open conversation about what those reforms may involve and why they are necessary. Economic stability cannot be sustained indefinitely through optimistic messaging alone. It requires transparency about both the progress achieved and the challenges that still lie ahead.
All in all, the UPND government’s most honest economic message packaging today should not simply be about whether the economy is recovering. It should also be about the full scope of the country’s expected economic challenges, openly discussed with the electorate. Because the real question facing Zambia as it approaches the next election is not merely who will govern the country. It is whether voters are willing to withstand another five years of deeper economic hardships when the hardest economic decisions are placed on the table after elections.
Kanyanta Chanda Kapwepwe is a governance analyst and senior lecturer at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology. He writes in his personal capacity.
