Who draws the map still decides the winner: why the 2026 delimitation bears the hallmarks of gerrymandering
Zambia’s 2026 delimitation and the constitutional risks to representation, transparency, and electoral fairness
By
Prof. Cephas Lumina
IN my earlier article published in The Mast on 15 January 2026, titled “Before the ballots are cast: Why the Electoral Commission of Zambia’s constituency delimitation will decide 2026,” I urged Zambians to remain vigilant as the country entered another delimitation exercise. A few weeks later, on 5 February 2026, in “Who draws the map decides the winner: Gerrymandering risks in the Electoral Commission of Zambia’s delimitation process,” I highlighted the risks of gerrymandering and outlined the forms that it can take.
Those warnings were grounded in a frequently overlooked reality: elections are not determined solely at the ballot box. Instead, they are often decisively shaped in advance by the rules structuring representation and the boundaries that determine how votes are translated into seats.
The Electoral Commission of Zambia’s (ECZ’s) announcement on 16 April 2026 of seventy new constituencies has now moved this issue from theoretical risk to concrete constitutional concern. The question is no longer whether delimitation can be manipulated. It is whether this particular exercise, taken as a whole, bears the hallmarks of gerrymandering.
The 16 April announcement and the problem of unverifiable compliance
On 16 April 2026, the ECZ announced the creation of seventy new constituencies, increasing the total number from 156 to 226. According to the ECZ Chairperson, Mrs Mwangala Zaloumis:
“In determining the 70 constituencies, the Commission was guided by the factors as outlined in the Constitution which place a duty on the Commission to consider the history, diversity and cohesiveness of communities; population density, trends and projections; geographical features; means of communication; the need to keep constituencies within districts; and the need to pursue approximate equality of population while still protecting adequate representation for urban and sparsely populated areas. Those are the principles that guided the Commission.”
This statement appears reassuring, as it mirrors the language of Article 59. However, this alignment is precisely where the underlying problem emerges.
In constitutional governance, it is not enough for a public body to assert compliance with legal criteria. It must demonstrate it. As of the time of writing, the ECZ has not published a comprehensive delimitation report explaining how it applied those criteria, how it resolved conflicts between them, or why it took particular decisions.
This omission is not merely a procedural oversight; it strikes at the core of constitutional legitimacy. The Constitution establishes transparency, accountability, and good governance as binding principles for state action. Delimitation, which determines the allocation of political power, requires the highest standard of transparency.
This failure is further exacerbated by the ECZ’s omission to publish the 2019 Delimitation Report prior to initiating the recently completed exercise. The absence of this report deprived the public of a necessary baseline for evaluating consistency and fairness. Collectively, these omissions establish a pattern of opacity in a context where transparency is essential.
What Article 59 actually requires: a hierarchy, not a checklist
Article 59 of the Constitution sets out the criteria for delimitation. It appears to present a list of equally weighted considerations: community cohesion, population, geography, communication, district integrity, and approximate equality.
However, a closer examination reveals a more structured approach: Article 59 establishes a hierarchy rather than a simple checklist.
At the apex sits approximate equality of population. This is not incidental language. It is the constitutional anchor. It is reinforced by the requirement to consider population density, trends, and projections, and by the instruction that the number of inhabitants in each constituency must be “reasonable.”
Taken together, these provisions embed the principle of “one person, one vote” as the governing standard.
Below this are population-based adjustments, which ensure that representation remains aligned with demographic realities over time.
Only then do we encounter geography and communication, which function as qualifying factors. These considerations recognise that strict numerical equality may sometimes be impractical, particularly in remote or sparsely populated areas. But they do not override population equality. They justify limited deviations from it.
The next layer consists of community cohesion, which reflects the idea that constituencies should not arbitrarily divide social or cultural units. This is a legitimate concern, but one that is inherently subjective and therefore vulnerable to manipulation.
Finally, district integrity operates at the lowest level, as an administrative convenience rather than a constitutional priority.
This hierarchy is not merely theoretical. It is supported by drafting history and comparative practice. Notably, proposals to elevate “vastness” or “size” as a primary criterion were not adopted. Geography was retained only as a practical consideration related to accessibility, not as a basis for weighting representation.
The implication is clear: population considerations take precedence, while geographic factors serve as qualifying criteria.
Concrete application: what the criteria mean in practice
This hierarchy becomes clearer when one considers how the criteria should operate in practice.
Where a constituency is characterised by difficult terrain—floodplains, poor road infrastructure, or remote settlements—some deviation from population equality may be justified because the ability of a representative to engage effectively with constituents is materially constrained. Similarly, sparsely populated regions with genuine accessibility challenges may require protection against under-representation.
However, these exceptions are justified by functional necessity, not by landmass or political convenience. They cannot legitimize a widespread pattern in which entire provinces receive disproportionately greater representation relative to their population. Likewise, they do not justify the persistent under-representation of densely populated urban areas where accessibility is not a limiting factor.
Community cohesion, while important, is particularly susceptible to abuse. It can be invoked to justify keeping communities intact, but it can equally be used to carve out politically advantageous constituencies under the guise of cultural or social alignment.
This is why population equality remains the constitutional anchor. Without it, the other criteria become open-ended tools capable of manipulation.
What the 2026 allocation reveals
When the constitutional framework is applied to the 2026 delimitation, the resulting pattern raises serious concerns.
The ECZ’s provincial summary shows that Lusaka, which accounts for approximately 15.7 percent of the national population, now has only eighteen constituencies, representing just 8 percent of the total. By contrast, Western Province, with about 7 percent of the population, now has twenty-six constituencies.
Southern Province, with roughly 12.1 percent of the population, has twenty-nine constituencies, the same as Eastern and Copperbelt, despite significant population differences. Muchinga, with less than 5 percent of the population, received the same number of new constituencies as Lusaka.
These figures do not align comfortably with the principle of population equality. They suggest a pattern in which less populated regions are over-represented relative to more densely populated areas.
This is precisely the concern raised in the analyses by historian, Sishuwa Sishuwa (“How to rig elections the legal way: Understanding the politics behind the 70 new constituencies,” The Mast, 20 April 2026) and co-founder of the Makanday Investigative Journalism Centre, Charles Mafa (“Before the Ballot: How Zambia’s New Electoral Map Could Deliver 133 Seats to UPND,” 17 April 2026). Dr Sishuwa argues that the allocation disproportionately favours sparsely populated regions that historically support the ruling party, while under-representing urban opposition strongholds such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt. He notes that a considerable proportion of the new constituencies were allocated to regions aligned with the ruling party, creating what he describes as an “in-built” electoral advantage before voting even begins.
Mafa’s analysis complements this perspective by translating structural imbalances into tangible electoral consequences. By applying historical voting patterns to the new constituency map, he demonstrates how the reallocation could materially shift parliamentary outcomes in favour of the ruling party. While his analysis does not claim that the outcome is predetermined, it illustrates that the new structure significantly alters the relationship between votes and seats.
Together, these analyses advance the debate beyond mere perception. They demonstrate that the allocation pattern, when considered alongside established voting behaviour, can create a predictable advantage. This constitutes the essence of gerrymandering: not necessarily irregularly shaped districts, but a systematic distortion in the distribution of representation.
The broader constitutional and political context
The delimitation exercise cannot be understood in isolation.
In its April 2025 report, the ECZ’s Electoral Reform Technical Committee (ERTC) recommended an increase in constituencies as part of broader electoral reforms. These recommendations fed directly into the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, No. 7 of 2025, which introduced significant structural changes to the electoral system.
The process through which these reforms were developed has been widely criticised for inadequate consultation and lack of transparency.
Compounding these concerns is the overlap in membership between the ERTC and the Technical Committee on Amendments to the Constitution (“the Technical Committee”). Among those appointed to the Technical Committee were several former members of the ERTC. A drafting expert on the Technical Committee was also a former ERTC member. This overlap raises legitimate questions about independence and institutional integrity.
Most significantly, the reported statement by President Hakainde Hichilema that the ruling party would have lost the 2026 elections without Bill 7 (Shadreck Jere, “We would have lost elections if Bill 7 hadn’t gone through – HH,” News Diggers, 20 March 2026) suggests that electoral reform was driven, at least in part, by considerations of political survival.
Recent political developments have reinforced this interpretation. Several senior figures within the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) have publicly indicated their intention to contest in newly created constituencies. This pattern is difficult to explain solely by reference to administrative or representational considerations. Rather, it lends empirical support to the argument advanced by Dr Sishuwa that the creation of additional constituencies may serve, in part, to manage internal party competition by creating space for both incumbents and emerging challengers (Sishuwa Sishuwa, “The devil in delimitation: why Hichilema is desperate to create new constituencies,” The Mast, 30 November 2025).
Viewed from this perspective, the delimitation serves a dual political function. It reshapes the electoral map in ways that may influence inter-party competition and manages intra-party tensions by redistributing political opportunities. The creation of new constituencies accommodates competing ambitions within the ruling party, thereby reducing the risk of internal fragmentation while structuring the landscape for electoral competition.
Within this broader context, delimitation emerges as more than a background institutional process; it functions as a mechanism through which political outcomes may be shaped in advance. This reinforces the concern that the drawing of boundaries is not merely preparatory to the election, but constitutive of its outcome.
Development, CDF, and a flawed justification
One of the justifications advanced for the creation of new constituencies is that it will improve development outcomes and make the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) more effective by bringing representation closer to the people.
This argument is difficult to sustain.
The primary challenges identified in studies and policy discussions on CDF effectiveness relate not to constituency size, but to administrative capacity, governance, accountability, and implementation. Creating more constituencies does not address these systemic issues. It risks replicating them.
More importantly, allocating CDF on a per-constituency basis rather than a population-based model entrenches inequality. Provinces with fewer people but more constituencies receive disproportionately larger allocations. As has been observed, this results in scenarios where less populated regions receive significantly more development funding than more densely populated provinces.
If development were the true objective, a population-based allocation model would have been more rational and equitable. Instead, the current approach suggests that developmental justifications are subordinate to political considerations.
Transparency and the burden of justification
Ultimately, all these concerns converge on a central issue: the absence of transparency.
Without a detailed delimitation report, it is impossible to assess whether deviations from population equality were justified, whether constitutional criteria were applied consistently, or whether the process was free from partisan influence.
In constitutional terms, this shifts the burden. Where outcomes appear to favour one side, and where the process lacks transparency, the responsibility lies with the decision maker to provide a clear and convincing justification.
To date, such justification has not been provided.
Conclusion: when the map becomes the outcome
Gerrymandering does not always manifest in obvious or dramatic forms. It frequently operates through technical decisions that shape outcomes well before votes are cast. The 2026 delimitation exercise exemplifies this concern.
The allocation of constituencies appears to depart from population-based representation in ways that favour particular regions. The broader political context suggests alignment between electoral reform and partisan advantage. The developmental justification is weak. And the absence of a transparent delimitation report prevents meaningful public scrutiny.
Considered collectively, these factors do more than generate suspicion; they establish a compelling case that the exercise exhibits the characteristics of gerrymandering.
In February this year, I warned that those who draw the map decide the winner. What now confronts us is a more troubling possibility: the map is not merely shaping the conditions of electoral competition but determining its outcome in advance.
