Zambia in accountability deficit
…As Hichilema’s failures emerge across 13 reports on Zambia
By Kanyanta Chanda Kapwepwe
ZAMBIA has been the subject of at least 13 significant reports and assessments published during the months surrounding and following the August 2026 general elections.
These are 13 different assessments, produced by institutions with different mandates and methodologies, yet they converge on a fundamental governance concern: the mounting evidence of institutional weaknesses and failures in the administration of President Hakainde Hichilema.
The most unsettling message emerging from these reports examining Zambia’s political, human-rights, electoral, institutional and economic landscape is that the country’s accountability problem extends far beyond isolated administrative failures. From the Human Rights Commission and European Union Election Observation Mission to the Auditor-General, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Transparency International Zambia, SADC, the African Union–COMESA mission, the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a troubling pattern emerges: questions about electoral transparency, the protection of fundamental rights, access to justice, institutional independence, public financial management and the state’s failure to deliver economic progress.
The common issue emerging from these reports is a failure of accountability and institutional enforcement: Zambia has laws, oversight bodies and formal democratic safeguards, but the evidence points to weaknesses in the institutions responsible for making those safeguards work in practice.
Put differently, the intersection is not simply corruption, electoral irregularities, or human-rights violations considered separately. It is the President’s failure to allow public institutions to exercise authority independently to prevent abuses of state power, correct failures, and provide remedies when things go wrong.
While these reports approach the problem from different directions, they all converge on the relationship between state power, institutional independence and accountability.
Firstly, the electoral reports point to deeper weaknesses in the institutions that are supposed to guarantee political competition and electoral legitimacy.
The EU Election Observation Mission identifies unequal campaign conditions, alleged police bias, cadreism, state-media bias, the suspension of results counting and the closure of courts during the election-petition period. Its eight priority recommendations point to a government failing in election results management, a government failing to offer equal campaign opportunities, a government refusing citizens access to justice, and the independence of public broadcasting.
The SADC, AU–COMESA and ECF-SADC observation statements also point to failures in transparency, provision of information about results, respect for the rule of law and confidence in the electoral process. Transparency International Zambia adds a more specific accountability failure. It called for law enforcement to act impartially and professionally, rather than allowing state institutions to give any political actor an unfair advantage.
Secondly, the human-rights reports point to weaknesses in the institutions that are supposed to restrain the exercise of state power.
Amnesty International’s August report describes restrictions on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly before the election, including the use of laws, intimidation and surveillance to restrict civic participation.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur’s concerns, the HRC’s monitoring and the ICJ’s September joint statement bring the question into the post-election period: whether citizens can exercise their rights, whether detainees receive due process, whether lawyers can represent clients without intimidation, and whether courts remain accessible when constitutional remedies are required.
Particularly, the ICJ statement evidently connects the closure of courts, the reported detention of opposition figures, threats to lawyers and questions surrounding judicial independence. These are not merely separate human-rights complaints. They concern the institutional safeguards that should prevent the misuse of state power.
Human Rights Watch’s November 1 investigation adds a further dimension. It documented 14 cases of apparent enforced disappearance and 61 cases in which detainees, lawyers or relatives alleged beatings or other violent abuse. It also reported that some people were detained without charge and that some charges appeared politically motivated.
The central accountability failure is whether independent investigations will establish what happened and whether those responsible, if identified, will face appropriate consequences.
Thirdly, the Auditor-General’s report shows that the accountability failures extend beyond electoral politics and human rights into the ordinary administration of the state.
The 2025 Auditor-General’s report identifies weaknesses in revenue collection, financial management, programme implementation, and safeguarding of public assets. It records K3.56 billion in outstanding Ministry of Health obligations, K626.64 million in uncollected mining penalties, more than K72 million in FISP irregularities, and 5,568 confiscated Mukula logs that could not be accounted for. It also records 27 unresolved audit-finding paragraphs at the conclusion of the audit. These findings point to a government failing to collect what it is owed. A government failing to control its own expenditure. A government failing to account for what it holds and even failing to correct its own identified administrative failures.
Fourthly, the World Bank and IMF reports expose the economic consequences and pressures surrounding public-sector performance.
The World Bank projects average growth of 5.2% over 2026–2028 but warns that this is insufficient to reduce poverty rapidly. It identifies high poverty, limited formal job creation, debt vulnerabilities and dependence on mining as continuing challenges. The IMF’s October agreement identifies revenue underperformance and higher-than-budgeted Food Reserve Agency expenditure as factors weakening the 2026 fiscal position. Its recommendations point to a government failing to mobilise its revenue and struggling with public financial management. A government with weak governance and anti-corruption institutions, and an administration with little transparency in mining licensing and beneficial ownership.
While these electoral, human-rights, audit and economic reports do not make identical allegations or reach identical conclusions, their findings intersect around the effectiveness and independence of the institutions entrusted with protecting citizens, safeguarding public resources and restraining the exercise of state power. Taken together, they expose a serious accountability deficit under Hichilema’s administration.
Kanyanta Chanda Kapwepwe is a governance analyst and lecturer at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology. He writes in his personal capacity.







