Zambia 2026 elections: Staying safe, lawful, and peaceful online in the age of AI
By Ali Kingston Mwila
ZAMBIA’S general elections are scheduled for 13 August 2026, and the official electoral calendar already outlines voter education and other preparatory activities.
As campaigns peak, social media and messaging platforms will carry an intense mix of political messaging, civic debate, and breaking news. That same volume also creates a fertile space for false alarms, fabricated accusations, hate speech, incitement, and tribal division—now amplified by AI tools that can generate convincing text, images, audio, and video at scale.
This article is an awareness and education note: how citizens, parties, influencers, administrators, and media teams can engage online without triggering harm—or legal exposure—while protecting free participation in democratic life.
1) AI will be used for both good and bad—your habits decide the outcome
AI can help campaigns and civil society communicate more clearly: translating messages into local languages, summarising policy documents, improving accessibility for persons with disabilities, or helping fact-checkers sift claims faster. But the same tools can also produce “cheap persuasion” content: fake endorsements, doctored videos, fabricated documents, and coordinated harassment.
The most dangerous election-time AI content is not always the most outrageous—it is the “almost believable” material that spreads fast before anyone verifies it. One manipulated clip shared in WhatsApp groups can ignite community tension faster than a long written statement.
Practical rule: treat viral political content as unverified until you can confirm (a) the original source, (b) the date, (c) the location, and (d) whether reputable outlets or primary accounts have published it.
2) What Zambia’s Cyber Crimes Act targets—and why that matters during campaigns
Zambia’s Cyber Crimes Act, 2025 (Act No. 4 of 2025) creates offences involving computers and electronic communications. Of particular relevance to election season are provisions that criminalise using computer systems to deceive or mislead about the origin/authenticity of communications (for example, spoofing, falsifying headers, or setting up deceptive systems). The Act also includes an offence related to disseminating information, a statement, or an image known to be false that harms a person’s reputation or exposes them to public ridicule, contempt, hatred, or embarrassment.
During campaigns, this is where risk rises:
- Sharing “screenshots” of alleged results or ECZ notices without confirmation
- Circulating claims that someone committed a crime, took a bribe, or belongs to a criminal group—without proof
- Forwarding AI-generated audio of a leader “saying” something inflammatory
- Impersonation of public figures or institutions for mobilisation or fundraising
Someone would say “I was only forwarding” does not erase harm. If you knowingly spread falsehoods or participate in deception chains, you could create legal exposure for yourself and others.
3) Cybersecurity enforcement vs “politics”: how to reduce suspicion and protect legitimacy
Let us ask some important questions. Will applying cyber laws be regarded as politics? In an election climate, enforcement can easily be perceived as selective, especially when arrests or takedowns involve political actors.
Civil society and digital rights groups have already raised concerns that Zambia’s newer cyber laws could be used in ways that chill expression or enable overreach if safeguards are weak. Whether one agrees with those critiques or not, perception is a real operational risk: enforcement that looks partisan can fuel distrust and escalate tension.
What strengthens legitimacy (for institutions and investigators):
- Clear public guidance on what is illegal (examples, thresholds, reporting channels);
- Consistent treatment across parties and regions; and
- Documented processes, warrants where required, and auditable digital forensics handling
- Preference for corrections, warnings, mediation, and takedown requests in low-harm cases—reserving arrests for serious harms (incitement, threats, coordinated violence, fraud, major impersonation)
What strengthens safety (for citizens and campaign teams):
- Publish corrections quickly when wrong;
- Separate opinion from allegation; label satire clearly; and
- Keep admin control tight on pages and WhatsApp groups; log who posts and arain volunteers on safe posting and verification
4) A simple “STOP” checklist before you share
Use this in every WhatsApp group and Facebook page:
S — Source: Who originally posted it? Can you find the first upload?
T — Time: When was it created? Old videos often resurface as “today.”
O — Objective evidence: Is there a primary document, official statement, or credible reporting?
P — People harm: Could this inflame tribe/region hostility, provoke attacks, or ruin someone’s name?
If any item fails, don’t share. Ask for verification—or drop it.
5) The election Zambia needs online
Zambia can have energetic debate without digital violence. AI is not destiny; it is a multiplier. If citizens reward truth, demand evidence, and refuse tribal bait, harmful content loses oxygen. And if institutions communicate clearly and enforce laws fairly, cybersecurity stops being “politics” and becomes what it should be: public safety, rights protection, and election integrity.
The most powerful contribution most people can make this election season is simple: verify before you amplify.
The author is a Speaker, Mentor, Educator, Trainer, Professional, IT & Cybersecurity. For comments email: cybermakzm@gmail.com, Phone +260 955 689 574
