Who draws the map decides the winner: Gerrymandering risks in the Electoral Commission of Zambia’s delimitation process
By
Prof. Cephas Lumina
In this column on 15 January 2026 (“Before the ballots are cast: Why the Electoral Commission of Zambia’s constituency delimitation could decide 2026”), I urged Zambians to remain vigilant as the country enters another delimitation cycle. That vigilance is now more necessary than ever, not because delimitation is inherently suspect, but because history shows that when the drawing of electoral boundaries is rushed, opaque, or politically charged, it can quietly become one of the most effective tools for distorting electoral outcomes.
Delimitation determines how votes are aggregated, how representation is structured, and how political competition is shaped. It is not simply an administrative exercise. It is the point at which law, demography, and power intersect. Across countries, this is precisely where gerrymandering thrives.
The danger is not that gerrymandering will announce itself openly. It rarely does. Its power lies in its subtlety, its technical appearance, and its ability to influence elections long before voters ever reach the polling station.
Zambia’s electoral map and the significance of delimitation
The country currently has 156 constituencies and 1,624 wards, each constituency electing one Member of Parliament and each ward electing a councillor. These electoral units are the foundation of representative democracy. Their boundaries determine which communities are grouped together, which interests are prioritised, and how political competition unfolds.
The Constitution assigns the responsibility for delimitation to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) under Articles 58 and 59. It also prescribes factors to guide delimitation: population density and trends, geographical features, means of communication, community cohesion, and approximate equality of constituency population. Importantly, the Constitution permits judicial review of delimitation decisions.
These safeguards exist for a reason. The drawing of electoral boundaries is not a neutral act. It can enhance democratic representation, or it can completely distort it.
The 2019 delimitation as a reference point
The last comprehensive delimitation exercise was conducted in 2019, with the final report completed in January 2020. According to the ECZ’s own report, the exercise ran from 8 July to 10 December 2019, taking approximately five months to complete. That period was consumed by structured consultations at district and provincial levels, the receipt of oral and written submissions, consolidation of proposals, and internal deliberations by the Commission.
The process ultimately produced a recommendation to increase the number of constituencies from 156 to 250, distributed across provinces based on population growth, vastness, terrain, and settlement patterns.
Whatever one’s view of those recommendations, the process itself acknowledged complexity. It accepted that meaningful public participation, careful demographic analysis, and defensible reasoning require time.
This matters because the current delimitation process is being conducted under significantly compressed and feasibly questionable timelines.
The new delimitation timeline and why it matters
In April 2025, the ECZ announced that it was reviewing the 2019 Delimitation Report to inform the constitutional amendment process. Last month, ECZ Chief Electoral Officer, Brown Kasaro, stated that the Commission intended to complete the new delimitation process before certification of the voters’ register, effectively allowing roughly three months for the exercise.
This is a stark departure from the five months taken in 2019.
The problem is not simply arithmetic. It is structural. A compressed timeline increases the risk that delimitation becomes administratively efficient but democratically deficient. When time is inadequate, certain key elements of the process are inevitably weakened: public engagement, disclosure of draft proposals, responsiveness to objections, and the ability of courts to meaningfully review outcomes.
These are precisely the conditions under which gerrymandering flourishes.
What gerrymandering is
Gerrymandering is the manipulation of electoral boundaries to advantage a political party, incumbent, or dominant group, while formally complying with legal requirements. It does not require illegally drawn boundaries. In fact, the most effective gerrymandering often operates comfortably within the grey areas of the law. Rather than changing how people vote, it changes how their votes are aggregated and translated into political power.
At its core, gerrymandering exploits the relationship between votes cast and seats won. By altering constituency boundaries, the same voting patterns can produce radically different electoral outcomes. A party may secure a disproportionate share of representation, or even legislative control, without winning a majority of the popular vote.
The classic techniques are well documented. Packing concentrates opposition voters into a small number of constituencies they win overwhelmingly, thereby “wasting” surplus votes. Cracking splits opposition-leaning communities across multiple constituencies so that they cannot form a majority in any. Stacking or dilution merges distinct communities with larger, politically hostile populations, weakening their collective influence.
Crucially, gerrymandering does not always produce oddly shaped constituencies. In many cases, the boundaries appear neat and rational. The manipulation lies in which communities are grouped together and which are separated.
Because delimitation criteria such as “population equality,” “geographical features,” or “community cohesion” are innately flexible, they can be selectively applied without violating the letter of the law. This is why gerrymandering is so difficult to detect and so consequential once entrenched.
Conditions that enable gerrymandering
Gerrymandering does not occur randomly. It emerges where specific enabling conditions exist. First, opacity. When delimitation criteria, population data, and draft boundaries are not publicly available early enough, scrutiny becomes impossible. Second, compressed timelines. Rushed processes limit public participation and reduce the likelihood of successful legal challenges. Third, discretion without explanation. Constitutional factors such as “community cohesion” or “means of communication” are inherently flexible. Without transparent reasoning, they can be selectively invoked. Fourth, political context. Where delimitation coincides with constitutional amendments or high-stakes elections, incentives to influence outcomes intensify. Finally, weak enforcement. The right to judicial review is meaningless if reports are published too late for effective litigation.
These are not abstract risks. They are practical realities observed across countries.
Why the current Zambian context is vulnerable
The country’s present delimitation context reveals several of these risk factors simultaneously. First, the absence of a published revised delimitation report. In April 2025, the ECZ announced that it was reviewing the 2019 Delimitation Report to inform the constitutional amendment process, yet neither the revised data nor proposed changes have been made public to date. This creates an information vacuum. Second, the linkage to constitutional reform. Delimitation is taking place after controversial and deeply polarising constitutional amendments affecting parliamentary representation. This timing inevitably heightens political stakes and intensifies incentives, whether explicit or implicit, to shape boundary outcomes in ways that do not align with broader constitutional objectives. Third, the shortened timeline. Completing delimitation in roughly three months, when the last exercise required five, makes meaningful nationwide participation difficult. Fourth, proximity to the August 2026 elections. As elections approach, pressure mounts to prioritise finality over deliberation.
Of course, none of this proves that gerrymandering is taking place. But it does mean that the conditions for it exist— and that Zambians need to be vigilant.
Gerrymandering without conspiracy
It is important to be clear: gerrymandering does not require bad faith or explicit conspiracy. It can occur through structural bias. For example, if urban constituencies are subdivided in ways that fragment opposition-leaning neighbourhoods, while rural constituencies remain intact despite population disparities, the effect may be politically skewed even if each decision is individually defensible. Similarly, if rapidly growing areas are grouped with sparsely populated regions under the guise of geographical considerations, vote dilution can occur without a single unlawful act.
This is why transparency and time matter. Gerrymandering is best prevented before boundaries are finalised, not litigated after the fact.
What this could mean for the August 2026 elections
If delimitation is flawed, the August 2026 elections may be procedurally free but structurally unfair. First, unequal constituency populations can undermine the principle of equal suffrage. Second, boundary manipulation can reduce electoral competitiveness, entrenching incumbency or regional dominance. Third, perceived unfairness can discourage voter turnout. Fourth, post-election legitimacy may suffer.
Elections do not derive legitimacy solely from the act of voting, but from public confidence that the system producing outcomes is fair.
Vigilance as a constitutional imperative
The Constitution does not place responsibility for democratic integrity solely on institutions. Article 2 imposes a duty on citizens to defend the Constitution. Vigilance is part of that duty.
Vigilance means demanding information, questioning timelines, scrutinising justifications, and, where necessary, invoking judicial review. It is not antagonism. It is constitutional participation and patriotism.
The ECZ’s independence does not exempt it from scrutiny. Independence exists precisely to enable transparent accountability, not to shield decision-making from public scrutiny.
What should happen now
If the risk of gerrymandering is to be minimised, several steps are essential. First, the ECZ should publish the revised delimitation report immediately, including population data, draft boundaries, and reasons for deviations from the 2019 recommendations. Second, there must be adequate time for public submissions. Third, the timeline should allow meaningful judicial review before implementation. Finally, the Commission should explain why three months is sufficient when five months were previously required.
Without these measures, assurances of transparency will struggle to overcome structural concerns.
Conclusion: maps decide futures
Elections are often framed as contests of ideas, personalities, and policies. But before any of that matters, the map decides who competes, where, and on what terms.
Gerrymandering is dangerous precisely because it hides in technical processes and legal language. It does not shout. It whispers.
Who draws the map often decides the winner. That is why this moment demands scrutiny, patience, and vigilance — not after the lines are drawn, but now.
