From Patriotic Front to Fractured Front
PF’s internal turmoil, fragility of Zambia’s multiparty democracy
By Wisdom Mwamba
AS ZAMBIA gears up for the 2026 general elections, the Patriotic Front (PF), once the ruling party under the late Edgar Chagwa Lungu, finds itself ensnared in a web of factionalism, arrests, and leadership battles that threaten not just its survival but the very foundations of the country’s multiparty democracy. The recent denial of bail to PF secretary general Raphael Nakacinda pending appeal is more than a legal setback it’s a symptom of deeper political malaise. In a nation where democratic transitions have historically been fraught with conflict, the PF’s ongoing implosion serves as a stark commentary on the challenges of sustaining a vibrant opposition in the face of internal divisions and external pressures.
The death of former president Edgar Lungu in June 2025 while receiving medical treatment in South Africa marked a pivotal turning point for the PF. Lungu, who had announced a political comeback in 2023 only to face the revocation of his retirement benefits by the current administration, left a power vacuum that has exacerbated existing schisms within the party. What followed was a scramble for leadership, with figures like Makebi Zulu emerging as contentious contenders. Zulu, who returned to Zambia after months abroad, has been accused of exploiting Lungu’s death and the family’s grief for political gain, including visits to imprisoned party members and public criticisms that have alienated key supporters. This so-called “Makebi Moment”, a term encapsulating Zulu’s bold but divisive maneuvers has highlighted the end of any lingering mediation efforts involving the Lungu family, who feel betrayed by politicians they once supported.
Adding fuel to the fire are the ongoing arrests and legal battles facing PF leaders. Nakacinda, a vocal critic of President Hakainde Hichilema’s government, was convicted in May 2024 of defaming the President and sentenced to 18 months in prison with hard labor a charge pursued despite the repeal of the relevant criminal defamation law in 2022. On November 10, 2025, the Lusaka High Court denied his bail application pending appeal, a decision announced amid updates from acting PF President Given Lubinda, who also addressed the incarceration of other figures like former minister Bowman Lusambo. These events are not isolated; they fit into a pattern of harassment against opposition members, including the use of the colonial-era Public Order Act to restrict gatherings and monitor movements. Other detained PF officials, such as former foreign affairs minister Joseph Malanji, underscore the party’s beleaguered state, with prison visits becoming rallying points for factional loyalties.
Political analysts view this turmoil as emblematic of Zambia’s broader struggles with multiparty democracy. Dr Nic Cheeseman, a noted expert on African politics, has argued in recent analyses that the absence of institutionalised succession rules in parties like the PF perpetuates a “culture of vengeance” where personal ambitions override party unity. In Zambia, transitions remain personality-driven, leading to conflicts that erode democratic stability,” Cheeseman notes, drawing parallels to historical schisms from Kaunda to Chiluba and beyond. This personalisation of power, he warns, not only fragments opposition parties but also invites government intervention, as seen in the suspension of three Constitutional Court judges in September 2024 just before they were to rule on Lungu’s eligibility for the 2026 polls, a moot point now due to his passing.
Human Rights Watch echoes these concerns in its 2025 World Report, highlighting the Hichilema administration’s “increasing authoritarian tendencies” that undermine civil and political rights. Analysts there point to the weaponisation of laws against dissent, including arbitrary detentions of journalists and activists covering opposition events. “The hostility toward criticism ahead of elections risks delaying or derailing democratic processes,” the report states, referencing Hichilema’s September 13, 2024, parliamentary address where he suggested that without constitutional amendments, elections might be postponed for years, a remark that has fueled speculation about eroding multiparty norms.
Local commentators, such as those in political broadcasts, have been equally critical of the PF’s internal dynamics. In discussions around the 2026 PF convention, analysts decry Makebi Zulu’s alleged disloyalty to the Lungu family, predicting it could cost him endorsements and funding. Meanwhile, figures like Michael Mulusa, a former politician, offer a sobering view: “There’s no resilient political party in Zambia; they come and go,” he remarked, citing the rise and fall of UNIP, MMD, and now PF as evidence of transient political entities in a volatile landscape. This impermanence, Mulusa argues, stems from factionalism rooted in patronage and tribal rhetoric, as seen in PF’s 2021 campaigns that discouraged cross-ethnic voting.
As a commentary, the PF’s saga underscores a critical juncture for Zambia’s multiparty system, established in 1991 after decades of one-party rule. While alternation of power evident in the PF’s ousting by the United Party for National Development (UPND) in 2021 demonstrates democratic vitality, the current infighting reveals vulnerabilities. Without reforms to institutionalise intra-party successions and protect opposition spaces, Zambia risks sliding into a de facto one-party dominance, where arrests become tools of political control rather than justice. The “culture of vengeance” between successors and predecessors, as articulated by analysts, perpetuates instability, deterring investment in democratic institutions and alienating voters weary of endless strife.
For Zambia’s multiparty democracy to endure, the PF must transcend its factions through transparent conventions and unity-building measures. Equally, the government must uphold its promises of press freedom and judicial independence, resisting the temptation to exploit opposition weaknesses. As the 2026 elections loom, the nation’s democratic health hinges on whether the PF can reinvent itself or if its fractures will pave the way for further erosion of pluralistic governance. The coming months will tell if this turmoil is a death knell for the Front or a catalyst for much-needed reform.
