Ballots under siege: political violence is poisoning
Zambia’s 2026 election
By
Professor Cephas Lumina
With only days left before the country votes on 13 August, killings, attacks on candidates, disrupted meetings, and police force against campaigners are turning what should be a contest of ideas into a climate of fear. The police and the Electoral Commission of Zambia must act swiftly, fairly, and decisively, or they will have to take responsibility for an election whose integrity is already in question.
A campaign trail stained by fear
THE country should not have to face another death or more tear gas to see the danger confronting this month’s general election. Political violence is not just campaign “excitement.” It takes away citizens’ freedom to hear competing ideas, attend rallies, and vote without fear.
The warning signs appeared during nominations. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) documented twelve incidents across six provinces, including intimidation and the blocking of candidates from reaching Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) nomination centres. The CCMG has said the Commission did not respond swiftly enough, while noting that the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) had expelled members implicated in violence and urging the party to report them to police. Transparency International Zambia separately recorded violence and intimidation in Mumbwa, Chavuma, Mazabuka and Choma.
The pattern continued. In Chawama’s John Howard area, a confrontation between UPND and Tonse Pamodzi Alliance supporters caused injuries, theft, and property damage; police made arrests. In Mandevu, police said suspected UPND supporters disrupted a lawful Tonse meeting. In Kabwe, a National Restoration Party for Unity and Progress candidate’s meeting was reportedly disrupted and property vandalised.
Blame should be based on evidence, but those responsible are often not unknown. Witnesses, political parties, and police often seem able to identify the people or groups involved. This raises an unavoidable question: why do so many incidents appear to occur in full public view but without swift, clear, and firm action against those responsible?
Then came deaths. A UPND supporter was killed after a clash involving UPND and NRPUP supporters in Kaputa, prompting arrests and the suspension of NRPUP campaigning there. In Magoye East, Stanley Sakala, a driver for an independent candidate, was found dead at a campaign camp; the ECZ said it awaited a conclusive police report. These cases demand thorough investigations, regular public updates, and prosecutions wherever the evidence permits.
Police conduct has deepened concern. Officers halted independent candidate Gary Nkombo’s Mazabuka rally and used tear gas after citing security concerns. In July, police fired tear gas during opposition presidential candidate Brian Mundubile’s Kalingalinga roadshow. The Government later said the party had notified police of a stadium rally, not a roadshow.
Even if there was a disagreement about the event’s format or route, the fundamental duty of the authorities is to facilitate peaceful political participation. Political gatherings should not be treated as nuisances to be suppressed. Police must distinguish between peaceful participants and those breaking the law, instead of dispersing entire gatherings indiscriminately.
The Constitution demands an election free from fear
Article 45 of the Constitution is unambiguous. The electoral systems used to elect the President, Members of Parliament and councillors must ensure “that citizens are free to exercise their political rights.” The electoral process and system for administering elections must ensure that elections are free and fair and, specifically, that they are “free from violence, intimidation and corruption.” The Constitution also demands independence, accountability, efficiency, and transparency in the electoral process.
These are not aspirations to be pursued only when convenient. They are binding constitutional principles that must guide the actions of the police, the ECZ, political parties and candidates.
That guarantee is breached before polling day if a candidate cannot file nomination papers safely, a supporter cannot wear party colours without risking attack, a resident fears attending an opposition rally, or a voter concludes that remaining at home is safer than joining a polling queue.
An election can be undermined long before voting begins. Even if the vote count is correct, it cannot cure a campaign poisoned by violence, selective policing, and fear. Electoral integrity covers the entire process: nominations, campaigns, rallies, access to voters, polling, counting and the resolution of disputes.
Article 193 directs the Zambia Police Service to protect life and property, preserve peace and maintain law and order, ensure the security of the people, detect and prevent crime, and uphold the Bill of Rights.
The Electoral Code of Conduct is equally direct. It requires the police to enforce law and order at campaign meetings and processions, to refrain from disrupting legally convened campaigns, and to ensure that officers do not use their positions to oppress any political party, candidate, or supporter.
Simply saying there is “zero tolerance” for political violence is no longer sufficient. Some arrests show that police can act. The more serious question is whether they act consistently, promptly, and impartially—and whether their investigations reach beyond the people who throw stones or carry weapons.
Who organised the violent groups? Who transported them? Who financed them? Who instructed them to block candidates, invade meetings, or attack rival supporters? Have parties that announced the expulsion of violent members supplied their names and evidence to investigators? How many reported cases have resulted in charges, and how many have reached court?
Police silence on these questions creates the impression that foot soldiers may occasionally be arrested while political sponsors and organisers remain untouchable. That perception is itself damaging to public trust.
ECZ must enforce, not merely lament
The ECZ is not a ceremonial observer of the electoral process. Article 229 requires it to implement the electoral process, conduct elections and referenda, settle minor electoral disputes, and regulate the conduct of voters and candidates. Its governing legislation requires it to direct, supervise and control elections fairly and impartially, ensure that elections are free and fair and promote conditions conducive to democratic electoral processes.
The Electoral Code of Conduct gives substance to those responsibilities. Citizens are entitled to express political opinions, campaign freely, participate in partisan political activities and seek the protection of the law from harm arising from their political opinions or affiliations.
The Commission must censure conduct intended to jeopardise elections, ensure that lawfully organised campaign rallies are not disrupted or arbitrarily prohibited, ensure that police act professionally and impartially, and provide equal opportunities for political parties and independent candidates to conduct lawful political activities.
The Code prohibits coercion, intimidation, violence, the carrying of weapons at political gatherings, the disruption of rival rallies and the obstruction of candidates’ access to voters. It also prohibits party members or supporters from inciting violence, destroying rival campaign materials, disrupting another party’s meeting, or preventing people from attending a political rally.
Most importantly, section 110 of the Electoral Process Act says the Commission shall enforce the Code of Conduct. It empowers the ECZ to act against a political party or candidate found to be in breach. The Commission may reprimand offenders, report violations to law enforcement agencies, summon alleged violators and impose administrative measures for persistent breaches.
The ECZ has acted in Mazabuka Central and Kaputa. However, suspending all campaigns can also punish peaceful candidates, supporters, and voters, especially when outsiders or unauthorized groups are responsible for the violence.
Enforcement must therefore be rapid, evidence-based, individualised, and even-handed. The Commission should publish the complaints it receives, the allegations investigated, the parties heard, its factual findings, the sanctions imposed and the matters referred to police.
Condemning violence without clear and open decisions is just public relations, not real regulation. The Commission cannot protect the election’s integrity by only issuing statements of concern after each incident.
Intimidation—or a pretext for soldiers?
It is legitimate to ask what the current violence is meant to achieve. Is it calculated to scare people away from opposition rallies, make challengers less visible, and convince voters that taking part in politics is risky? Is it intended to suppress turnout in certain constituencies? Is it designed to keep opposition candidates out of some communities?
There is another disturbing possibility. Is unchecked disorder creating—or being allowed to create—a justification for the deployment of the Defence Force before polling day?
There is no verified public evidence proving the existence of a centrally planned scheme to prepare for military deployment. Such a serious claim cannot responsibly be made without evidence. But the suspicion cannot simply be dismissed because Zambia has a recent precedent.
In 2021, escalating campaign violence preceded the deployment of military personnel. The African Union Election Observation Mission noted that this was the first such deployment during a Zambian electoral process, while opposition actors argued that the military presence was intimidating.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 37 states that the military should not generally be used to police assemblies. Where military personnel are exceptionally and temporarily deployed in support of civilian authorities, they must be professionally trained in human rights and must comply with the standards applicable to law enforcement officials.
The General Comment also emphasises the state’s duty to facilitate peaceful assemblies. Restrictions should not become blanket prohibitions, while force should be used only where necessary and proportionate. Tear gas and other crowd control measures should not substitute for communication, planning, targeted enforcement, and the protection of peaceful participants.
The Government can dispel suspicions by publishing clear security protocols, ruling out partisan or unnecessary military deployment, and demonstrating that civilian police are both capable of and committed to protecting lawful political activity.
President Hakainde Hichilema has condemned politically motivated violence and affirmed that every party has the lawful right to campaign during the period allocated by the ECZ. He has said that anyone attempting to disrupt a lawful campaign must face the full consequences of the law. That commitment must now be translated into impartial police protection and courtroom accountability—not another statement filed away after the cameras have left.
International standards demand action
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 25, concerning participation in public affairs and the right to vote, states that intimidation or coercion of voters must be prohibited by criminal law and that those laws must be strictly enforced. It also stresses the importance of independent electoral administration and conditions in which voters can form opinions freely, without violence, threats of violence, compulsion, inducement, or manipulative interference.
General Comment No. 37 adds that states have a positive duty to facilitate peaceful assemblies and protect participants against violence by non-state actors. The state cannot excuse inaction by arguing that cadres, rather than public officials, threw the stones. Where authorities know or ought reasonably to know that participants face a threat, they must take reasonable measures to protect them.
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in its resolution relating to elections taking place in Africa in 2026, including Zambia, called upon states to protect political participation, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. It urged governments to avoid using security forces against opposition campaigns and peaceful protests and to safeguard the independence of electoral bodies.
Thus, the country will be judged not just on whether ballot papers arrive on time, but also on whether citizens can go to rallies, campaign offices, and polling stations free from intimidation.
Zambians rejected cadre rule in 2021
Political violence can be conducted by party cadres, rival supporters, criminal groups, or hired individuals. But it happens because others provide money, transport, weapons, instructions, protection, or allow them to act without consequences.
Political leaders establish incentives. Organisers mobilise groups. Financiers provide resources. Local operatives identify targets. Foot soldiers carry out the attacks. A credible response must therefore investigate the entire chain of responsibility rather than focusing only on the most visible participants.
Violence is not permanently owned by one political party. In 2021, election observers recorded violent conduct involving supporters of both the Patriotic Front (PF) and the UPND, alongside concerns about unequal restrictions imposed by state authorities.
Yet Zambians answered that atmosphere with a voter turnout of more than 70 per cent and a decisive democratic transfer of power. The election was assessed as largely peaceful and credible overall despite serious failures during the pre-election period.
It is reasonable to see that high participation meant citizens refused to let cadres decide who could campaign, vote, or govern. Zambians chose the ballot over intimidation. They should not have to face the same struggle again.
A final chance to protect the election
The police must protect every lawful rally, arrest perpetrators regardless of political affiliation, investigate organisers and financiers, publish progress on significant cases, and stop using indiscriminate force against peaceful campaigners. They must also make clear that notifying the police of a political meeting does not place political participation at the mercy of individual officers. Public order laws should be administered to facilitate lawful assembly, not to create a disguised system under which opposition parties require police permission to campaign.
The ECZ must hold rapid hearings, issue reasoned decisions, sanction proven breaches and publish its enforcement record. It should deploy monitors to political events where violence is considered likely and engage parties before rival programmes create preventable confrontations.
Political leaders must surrender violent supporters to the law instead of merely expelling, relocating, or quietly recycling them. A political party that condemns violence publicly while shielding perpetrators privately is not promoting peace. It is managing appearances.
Citizens must be able to attend political gatherings, hear from different candidates, and vote for the candidate and party of their choice without worrying about risks to themselves, their homes, businesses, or livelihoods. This is not a special favour granted by the government, police, or ECZ. It is a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
On 13 August, the country will count more than just ballots. Every ignored assault, every rally stopped without lawful excuse, every organizer not held accountable, and every ECZ warning without real follow-up will also be counted.
Unless political violence is confronted firmly now, the election may still produce numbers and declared winners—but it will carry a wound to its legitimacy that no announcement of results can erase.
